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1. Nudge: The Pitch 
Suppose that a government’s social policy agenda is to promote a 
healthier, wealthier, and happier population. The problem is that our 
psychological makeup means that we find it hard to behave in ways 
that consistently meet these objectives. Over half a century, a steady 
accumulation of social scientific research shows that people are sus-
ceptible to cognitive biases, that they fail to exercise self-control when 
it really matters, give in to their emotions too easily, and make snap 
decisions without thinking hard about the consequences. Together, 
the frailties of being human mean that the population often makes 
poor personal, social, financial, environmental, occupational, and 
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health related choices. Ultimately, all of this contributes to poor men-
tal and physical health, which in turn leads to unhappiness. So, how 
does the government intervene in such a way as to improve the deci-
sions the population make around health, wealth, and happiness, 
while at the same time preserving freedom of choice?  
The typical tools of the policy maker’s trade are mandates, bans, 
taxes, fines and financial incentives. In other words, the policy mak-
er’s tool kit involves inducing the population to make “good” choices 
by offering a carrot (i.e. reward), threatening a stick (i.e. punishment), 
or a combination of both.  
Since publication of Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) groundbreaking 
book Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness, pol-
icy makers can now add another tool to their kit: nudges. “Nudge is 
any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in 
a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly chang-
ing their economic incentives” as defined by Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008, 6).  
What does this mean in practice? Nudges, in the broadest of terms, 
are behavioural change techniques. These are methods that are de-
signed to guide people to make better choices (as they themselves 
would judge as better),1 by exploiting insights from psychological 
research. That is, if the policy maker knows what motivates people, 
how they process information, and how they make decisions, then it 
is also possible to construct the options that people face in a given 
context in such a way as to make the “better” option easier to choose. 
Hence the term behavioural change technique, because it uses psy-
chological research in order to create changes in behaviour at a popu-
lation level.  
Two terms that Thaler and Sunstein (2008) introduce as part of the 
language of nudge are choice architecture and choice architect. Choice 
architecture means the way in which the options are presented to 
people in a given context when they make their decisions. We’ll ex-
amine an example of this shortly. The choice architect is the individu-
al/organization that fashions the options in a given choice context, in 
order to promote one option being more likely selected over another.  
In addition, Sunstein has developed a conceptual and ethical frame-
                                                        
1 The issue of what is “better” is loaded for two reasons. First, there have been 
several discussions regarding whether it is possible to evaluate nudged options 
as rational, or even optimal (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2015). Which has since led Sunstein 
(2016) to propose that a useful criterion by which the nudged choice ought to be 
evaluated as the “better” choice, should be on the grounds of what the individual 
judges as better. Second, this same argument is also used as a way to justify 
nudges on ethical grounds, because, however the nudge is implemented, the 
individual that has been nudged can judge whether their behaviour has been 
improved as a result of the nudge, if it has, then the nudge is justified. Put simp-
ly, individuals determine the desired “ends”, and the ends justify the means.   
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work that helps justify the nudge programme, which he describes as 
liberal paternalism. Nudges aim to increase the likelihood of the “best” 
option being selected, but crucially they do this without eliminating 
freedom of choice. In other words, an authority might decide what 
choice behaviour is best, but rather than force that behaviour onto 
people, instead, people are guided towards making the “better” 
choice themselves, and can always still choose a “worse” option. This 
approach solves several major problems that a policy maker faces, the 
most obvious of which is how to “encourage” people to make good 
lifestyle choices that benefit them and society, while at the same time 
preserving their right to choose what to do (within the legal frame-
work of the law of that country).  
In order to gain a better sense of what these terms mean, and how 
they apply to real world situations, let’s now consider a typical ex-
ample of a nudge: Automatic defaults. There is a long history of au-
tomatic defaults being used by public and private institutions in 
many different contexts (e.g., organ donation, pension schemes, 
health insurance, phone tariffs, energy providers) (Sunstein, 2015). 
Usually what happens is that the institution, let’s say in this case it is 
the government, pre-select an option that is deemed the “better” op-
tion, and it enrols the population onto an organ register system. So, to 
clarify, the choice architect is the government, and the choice architec-
ture is the construction of the options (i.e. donate, not donate), and 
the nudge is the pre-selected option “donate”. The liberal paternal-
istic justification here is that people should remain on the register if 
they have a preference for doing so, but that if not, then they can ac-
tively choose to “opt-out” of the organ donation register.  
Why might this nudge technique work? Thaler and Sunstein (2008) 
claim that in this context there are emotional barriers to thinking 
about, and then actually doing something about enrolling on an or-
gan donation register. So, by pre-selecting the option to donate one’s 
organs, the government increases the number of people on the organ 
donation register (which in most countries is still lower than the de-
mand for organ donations), and takes away the mental effort and 
emotional pain. At the same time the nudge technique also exploits 
people’s inertia or “status quo bias” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), so 
that they are more likely to be locked into the defaulted option be-
cause there is a small cost in time and effort to “opt-out” of the regis-
ter.  
The essential message that is promoted by Nudge advocates is that 
nudges, just like the example given here, are simple to implement, 
cheap (relative to typical regulatory policy tools), and, are ultimately 
choice preserving because people are never prevented from choosing 
the non-nudged choice, only that it is harder for them to do so. More 
to the point, nudges can help promote a healthier, wealthier, and 
happier population. 
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2. Nudge: The Issues at Stake 
As is the case with any successful idea, there are many commentators 
that will likely take issue with it. Nudge is no exception. In fact, given 
the popularity of the nudge programme, and the fact that it has been 
incorporated into many governments across the world, the work of 
Thaler and Sunstein has attracted close scrutiny. The occasion for this 
review is Sunstein’s (2016) most recent book on nudge The Ethics of 
Influence: Government in the Age of Behavioral Science; a detailed discus-
sion of the ethics behind nudge. The aim of this essay is to use Sun-
stein’s (2016) recent book as a start and end point to a discussion of 
the evolution of Sunstein’s views on nudge following his pioneering 
work with Thaler (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).  
Returning to the example discussed in the previous section, sever-
al questions on the theme of ethics have been raised. Is it ethical to 
automatically enrol people on an organ donation register, which 
promotes a decision that society benefits from, but that essentially 
relies on psychological trickery? On what criteria should we judge 
whether or not a nudge is ethical? When is a nudge designed by gov-
ernment simply regarded as having a benign influence on behaviour 
and when is it deemed coercion? These are the starting points for the 
first chapter of Sunstein’s (2016) latest book in which a set of condi-
tions are introduced that nudges fulfil on ethical grounds. The follow-
ing four chapters then go into considerable depth on matters of wel-
fare, dignity and autonomy, with a particular focus on Mill’s Harm 
principle: “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exer-
cised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is 
to prevent harm to others.” (1859, 21) The reader is presented with 
many examples of nudges that have been implemented in a variety of 
ways and in a variety of contexts to help illustrate where and when 
state interventions are more or less ethical. To help support the ar-
guments being laid out earlier in a later chapter Sunstein summarizes 
findings from several recent surveys designed to gauge public opin-
ion on nudges. As a further defence of the thesis of the book, which is 
that nudges are indeed ethical, the penultimate chapter applies many 
of the criteria for evaluating the ethicality of nudges to show that they 
are ethical in the context of encouraging collective action to protect 
the environment. The final chapter rounds the book off by defending 
nudges by contrasting them to mandates, with a postscript titled “A 
very brief recapitulation” in which Sunstein’s uplifting concluding 
point is that respecting freedom of choice has helped many nations 
work towards their ideals, and as they continue to do so, nudges are 
essential to fully realising their ideals.   
What follows in the next section of this review essay is an exami-
nation of Sunstein’s earlier proposals on the nudge programme. The 
aim of this section is to use the progression of his ideas up until his 
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most recent book as a way to understand how the nudge programme 
has been developed, and how the nudge thesis has changed. Three 
questions that constrain the focus of the review of Sunstein’s earlier 
books are: 1) What are the distinctive characteristics that constitute a 
nudge? 2) If one is to go about constructing it with the view to im-
plementing a nudge, what does a choice environment look like? 3) 
What makes nudges ethical?  
3. Nudge: The Justification for the Nudge Programme 
The point to remember about nudges, and what makes them so com-
pelling, is that, assuming that they actually do work, the way in 
which they are supposed to work is by making the “better” option 
(e.g., a healthier food option, a pension plan, a fuel efficient home 
energy provider) easier to select. Crucially, this is done without hav-
ing to significantly change the pay-off structure (i.e. without finan-
cially incentivising “better” options). All the hard work in generating 
a change in choice behaviour is done by utilising psychological pro-
cesses and directing them to help people make choices that, in the 
long run, are good for them and society. These are the defining prop-
erties of nudge as presented in Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) definition 
of nudge. 
So, perhaps anticipating an ethical critique, a key message estab-
lished right at the start of the authors’ first book on nudge (2008), and 
repeated throughout, is that nudges are unavoidable, they are every-
where in life, and that they are never neutral. Whenever any of us 
attempt to change the way we present information in such a way as to 
influence other people’s choices, we are acting as choice architects—
nudgers. Given how pervasive nudges are, there is little reason to 
take issue with them on ethical grounds. Any generalised ethical cri-
tique levelled at nudging problematises something all of us do on a 
regular basis.2 There isn’t much more development of this argument 
in Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) book.   
                                                        
2 Well, it is true that setting everyday behaviour against some standard of abso-
lute “purity” is rarely useful. In this example, setting Nudge against an ideal of 
absolute straightforwardness is clearly naïve (indeed, too easy a faith in straight-
forwardness can be dangerous: witness the controversy caused by the “straight-
forward presentation of the facts” in recent UK “deliberative polling” consulta-
tions, to take but one example). But surely we can acknowledge that a practice is 
pervasive without accepting that pervasiveness makes it morally neutral. Dis-
honesty and violence are also pervasive social phenomena, but they are constant-
ly problematised, and controlled, by complex moral discourses; the ideals op-
posed to these problems, truth and peace, while never fully realised in the world, 
nonetheless give us conceptual reference points from which to launch discourse. 
The same must hold true for an ideal of straightforwardness—something like an 
ethic of integrity in nuanced, contested social environments where no agent can 
make simple claims to truth. Gladly, the need for the development of a more 
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What is the choice environment? While Thaler and Sunstein (2008) 
refer to the term choice environment often, they are never explicit 
about what the environment is. In other words, does it only refer to 
the options that people are faced with, in any given context, or does it 
also include the social, political, economic, cultural properties that 
also play a role in the way people make their choices? There is no 
answer to this question. In fact Thaler and Sunstein (2008) do not 
specify what the particular properties are of the environment in 
which nudges are implemented (i.e. where should they be used—and 
what are the best fits between the context and the nudges). They also 
don’t say what the corresponding outcomes in the environment are 
that demonstrate the influence of nudges. In fact on the latter ques-
tion, the rather glib response from Thaler and Sunstein (2008, 247) is 
that the evaluation of the success of nudges depends on their effects, 
which could be in terms of whether the nudges hurt or help people.  
What are nudges? Also, what don’t count as nudges? Towards the 
end of their book (chapter 14), Thaler and Sunstein (2008) list 12 ex-
amples of nudges which receive specific attention and discussion. In 
this chapter, the ranges of contexts in which nudges appear are huge-
ly varied, they don’t always occupy physical spaces, and the nudges 
themselves are mostly bans, or financial incentives. Almost all of the 
examples of nudges don’t fit the authors’ own definition of nudge, 
moreover, the choice environment is predominately economically 
structured, so that options are associated with outcomes that have 
financial rewards or costs.  
For instance, two of the examples of nudge involve choice envi-
ronments that are constructed in ways that involve financial induce-
ment. One is focused on dissuading teenage mothers from having 
more babies, and the other is focused on dissuading drinkers from 
over-consumption of alcohol. In the former case the mothers get a 
dollar a day for every week they don’t get pregnant which goes to-
wards a college fund, and the drinkers are encouraged to use their 
own money to buy a drug that makes them vomit whenever they 
have a tendency to want to drink alcohol; the idea being that this 
negatively reinforces them to stop drinking. Both “nudges” are de-
signed to induce behavioural change of abstinence, both involve the 
use of funds to help change behaviour, but what is the choice envi-
ronment here? What is the specific nudge that is being implemented? 
Is it still the same in both examples? In fact, from the 12 nudges pre-
sented, it is very hard ascertain what makes a nudge a nudge, and 
what conditions are necessary in order to construct a nudge.  
Suffice to say, if any researcher or policy maker wanted to consult 
THE guide book on nudges to decide what nudge to implement given 
                                                                                                                             
sophisticated ethics of influence is recognised, and at least partly met by Sunstein 
in the course of the next eight years since the seminal nudge book in 2008. 
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a particular problem, and how to construct the appropriate choice 
environment to promote “better” choice behaviour, the answers 
aren’t provided in Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) seminal book. If any-
thing the book provides a hazy, complicated and conflicting picture 
as to what the choice environment is, what a nudge actually is, and 
whether these nudges are effective in doing what they set out to do. 
What is clear is that a discussion of the ethics of nudges doesn’t fea-
ture significantly in the first book on Nudge, because that isn’t the 
primary objective of the book. The aim of the first book is to lay out 
the reasons for why nudges are a good alternative to conventional 
regulatory tools of government. 
If we consult Sunstein’s (2013) book Simpler: The Future of Govern-
ments and then Sunstein (2014) Why Nudge? The Politics of Libertarian 
Paternalism, perhaps we will find more detailed answers to our three 
core questions? In both books (Sunstein, 2013, 2014), Sunstein makes 
the same strong claim as is made in the seminal book on nudge, 
which is that nudges can be found everywhere, and everyone at some 
point can be classified as a choice architect. This is beginning to sound 
like a pre-emptive strike against the looming threats against nudges 
on ethical grounds. If we wanted to know what nudges are, in both 
books (Sunstein, 2013, 2014) an explicit connection between nudges 
and financial incentives is made. In fact, Sunstein (2013) goes into 
some detail on a few key nudges, each of which seems to involve fi-
nancially incentivizing people to select the “better” option (2013, 136). 
We see this again in Sunstein’s 2014 book, in which a host of exam-
ples of nudges are presented, but few of which actually adhere, in any 
strict sense, to the original definition of a nudge.  
In Sustein’s 2013 book one clue as to how to construct a choice ar-
chitecture is mentioned: “The broadest point is that private and pub-
lic institutions often fail because they make things difficult. Some-
times they make things difficult because they do not select simple, 
sensible default rules. Sometimes they create inadvertent problems 
because they list, and do not structure a wide range of options. Often 
the best approach is to make things automatic, so that if people do 
nothing at all, they’ll be just fine.” (2013, 128) Making options auto-
matic is the job of defaults, and in fact the use of automatic defaults is 
deemed so important that Sunstein dedicates his entire 2015 book to 
the merits and pitfalls of automatic defaults.  
Unlike the first book, in Sunstein’s 2013 book, we see a discussion 
of ethical matters concerning nudge, but really only from the point of 
view that the nudged “better” option is generally justified on ethical 
grounds because it serves the good of the individual, and the good of 
society. Crucially, what is deemed good is also one that the individu-
al should also recognize as good, and this argument takes full force in 
his latest 2016 book. But still, the fact seems to be that Sunstein (2013) 
finds the matter of having to justify nudges on ethical grounds too 
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obvious to go into much discussion on it. For instance, Sunstein 
(2013) describes a case where a choice architect may construct an ar-
chitecture that leads to an intended positive outcome (e.g. reducing 
asbestos in building materials), but also inadvertently generates nega-
tive consequences (e.g., increases the use of other cheap and toxic 
alternatives). This seems to be a concession that the motives of the 
choice architect matter when it comes to evaluating nudges, either on 
ethical grounds, or simply on the basis of achieved behavioural suc-
cess. In fact this point is explored in his later books where he makes a 
distinction between a “means paternalist” and an “ends paternalist” 
(2014, 19; 2016, 54). This distinction is based on whether the choice 
architect is motivated to support an outcome by focusing on the con-
ditions that will help to bring it about (means), or is motivated to 
prohibit an outcome by punishing it (ends).    
Sunstein’s (2014) book starts much the same way as his earlier 
books, with a riff we are familiar with now. That is, choice architec-
ture (whatever that is) is unavoidable, it is social, and that virtually 
everyone is a choice architect in some way (2014, 16). The same points 
are also used to make a general sweeping justification for the use of 
nudges by government.  
Of all his books thus far, Sunstein (2014) is the most explicit in as-
serting the link between guided choices and the differences in the 
costs (i.e. personal harms which could be physical, psychological, 
financial) that they generate, and that the relative weight of these 
costs are to be assessed by reference to a graded notion of paternalism 
(2014, 51). This is where we see a dedicated discussion on ethics. He 
goes into great detail on Mill’s Harm principle as a talking point 
around different types of nudges, and their corresponding association 
with different shades of paternalism (2014, 52). That is, the harder the 
form of paternalism, the greater the costs to the individual in choos-
ing the non-nudged option that is judged by the state/science as lead-
ing to harm (e.g., banning smoking in public places); his distinction 
between hard and soft paternalism is explored again in more detail in 
his latest 2016 book.  
It might be fair to say that Sunstein (2014) is beginning to relent to 
the mounting scepticism from the academic community on the matter 
of nudges on ethical grounds. Not only does Sunstein (2014) concede 
that ethics matter, but also he concedes the potential limitations of 
nudges. He does this by suggesting that a one-size-fits-all strategy 
may not be the most effective approach to collective behavioural 
change (2014, 19), and that profiling an individual’s preferences and 
values might be a better way of effectively nudging people, because 
by doing this the choice architect develops a more nuanced under-
standing of what best serves the individual’s needs. He picks this 
point up again in his following book (Sunstein, 2015), but this time 
having had some time to think about things, Sunstein is critical of the 
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use of personalizing nudges (2015, 157-173), and spends a whole 
chapter discussing why that might be a problematic approach (2015, 
257-173).  
Sunstein (2014) dedicates a chapter to “the Paternalist’s toolbox”, 
which offers false hope for any choice architect that is embarking on 
constructing a choice architecture and seeks guidance on what it is 
and how to go about constructing it. Though perhaps, given that 
choice architectures are everywhere, this might be the reason why 
they are so hard to define. However, this section does provide the 
most explicit details thus far, on the nature of regulation—i.e. what 
types of nudges governments are likely to use, and the impact they 
are designed to have; these could be on the basis of specific outcomes 
on choice behaviour, changing preferences, and even influencing be-
liefs. To clarify this, Sunstein also outlines four classes of nudges: 1) 
those that affect outcomes without influencing beliefs and actions 
(e.g., automatic enrolment), 2) those that influence actions without 
influencing beliefs (a civil fine), 3) those that influence beliefs as a 
route to influencing actions (Educational campaigns), and 4) those 
that influence preferences as a way to influence actions, bypassing 
beliefs (graphic images on cigarette packets). While it looks like we 
are now getting closer to comprehensive answers to our three major 
questions, rather than go into more depth on the ideas developed in 
2014, in the next book Sunstein (2015) abandons this, and instead pre-
sents a focused explanation on defaults.    
Instead of giving people active choice, Sunstein (2015) presents 
four conditions under which a policy maker would be advised to 
implement automatic defaults: 1) when the context is confusing, 2) 
when people prefer not to choose, 3) when learning is not important, 
4) when the population is homogenous along a relevant dimension 
(Sunstein, 2015, 18). Suffice to say, on careful inspection, some of the 
automatic defaults most commonly referenced by the nudge pro-
gramme don’t meet these four conditions (e.g., automatic enrolment 
of pension plans, and retirement funds). As a reader we have come to 
be well versed in the general justification for nudges, in this case de-
faults. However, Sunstein (2015) does expand on the general sweep-
ing arguments by claiming that most of the time people would rather 
avoid making choices, and don’t want to have to make a choice for 
every trivial matter (2015, 146). It is the responsibility of institutions 
to make informed decisions on behalf of individuals (e.g., computer 
settings, energy providers, health insurance, internet search engine 
settings, pension plans, phone tariffs). More to the point, people want 
to be freed up so as to have time to make choices about more conse-
quential matters (2015, 207); presumably deciding on whether to do-
nate one’s organs or not, is not a consequential matter. In addition, he 
argues that in the case of nudges, an automatic default does two 
things, it allows people the freedom to choose when they want to 
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choose, and not choose if they don’t want to choose. This of course 
would seem perfectly ethical if people were actually making active 
choices one way or another (a = choose, b = abstain). But the whole 
point of defaults is that people do not choose and need not even be 
aware that there is (or was) a choice to make. Defaults by definition 
aren’t neutral or symmetric with respect to the alternative options, 
and the preferences of the individual are presumed, along with their 
consent. Therefore, we are expected to place a lot of trust in the agents 
implementing automatic defaults on our behalf, which is a matter less 
serious when we have active choice. It is for this reason that Sun-
stein’s example of the global positioning system (GPS) as a nudge 
(which he is using again in his 2016 book) (2015, 6) is misleading. The 
GPS pre-selects a route for us, but prior to even following the route, 
or not, we can choose to activate the GPS or not. When it comes to 
organ donation, and living in a nation that adopts an automatic opt-
out system, people aren’t actively choosing between choosing (do-
nate/not donate) and abstaining. The final sections of Sunstein’s 2015 
book lay the foundations for further discussion in his 2016 book. The 
matter of coercion, and whether nudges are examples of coercive tac-
tics (Sunstein argues that they aren’t, 2015, 189-203), and the justifica-
tion of defaults relative to mandates, are picked up again in his most 
recent book. 
4. Nudge: The Defense on Ethical Grounds 
In this final section we’ll focus on Sunstein’s (2016) latest book, and 
how it constructs the main thesis of the book, which is a defence of 
nudge on ethical grounds.   
At the start of the book the question that Sunstein (2016) poses 
himself is “what are the ethical constraints on influence, when it 
comes from government?” (2016, 3). The short answer is: Welfare, 
Autonomy, Dignity and Self-government. At a later point he consid-
ers which one of these ought to be the ethical grounds on which 
nudges should be evaluated, and suggests that one should really only 
worry about welfare vs. autonomy of choice (2016, 62). Why might he 
say this? The clue to answering this comes from arguments he has 
made before in his other books, such as the fact that people do not 
always want to face making active choices (Sunstein, 2015; Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008), and people shouldn’t have to make choices over so 
many matters in which they could defer to experts (Sunstein, 2015); 
assuming of course that people can trust them (for a recent analysis of 
public opinion on experts see, Weingart and Guenther, 2016)  
Along with this question, Sunstein poses several others about the 
ethics of nudge, and how nudges differ from coercion. His general 
response to these questions are that nudges are everywhere, and eve-
ry environment in which we are primed, guided, directed, socially 
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manipulated, is a choice environment, and so we don’t really have 
much of a legitimate basis on which to significantly worry about 
nudges since they are part and parcel of many choice situations we 
face. The problem is that this openly admits the fact that anything can 
reasonably count as a nudge (one also sees this on page 26 which in-
cludes a further list of diverse examples of nudges). From a scientific 
point of view, this presents the community with a deep problem, be-
cause it renders the nudge programme unfalsifiable. If one cannot 
really know what a nudge is, since everything counts as a nudge, 
how does one test the efficacy of nudges against other relevant non-
nudge alternatives? Also, how can the scientific/philosophy commu-
nity assess the ethics of nudge relative to other non-nudge alterna-
tives, if it isn’t clear what nudges are and what they aren’t? A trou-
bling consequence of this is when Sunstein tells us “Hitler nudged; so 
did Stalin” (2015, 25). These two individuals cannot possibly be ex-
amples of choice architects of nudges, assuming that nudges are free-
choice preserving, by Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) definition.  
Given that the book is a defence of nudges on ethical grounds, 
Sunstein presents 8 principles that defend nudges (2016, 18). The first 
principle is the one that states that nudges are everywhere and inevi-
table. The rest seem to be a collection of personal musings (principle 
4: defaults can potentially promote autonomy, principle 5: dignity 
ought to be preserved if the choice architecture is good), confusing 
(principle 3: based on welfare it is a requirement that governments 
employ nudges on ethical grounds, principle 6: self-government can 
determine what nudges might be acceptable, reasonable, or should be 
prohibited) and statements of the obvious (principle 7: nudges can be 
bad if the choice architect has a malicious agenda, principle 8: manip-
ulation is everywhere, and can be bad). Later, Sunstein delves into 
two central arguments that build a defence of nudges; these are, first-
ly: any critique of nudges on ethical grounds needs to be nuanced, 
examining nudges on a case by case basis, looking at the context they 
are applied in, the particular nudge being used, and the motivation 
behind applying it.  There cannot be a single sweeping ethical prob-
lem with nudges because the nudge programme is made up of many 
different types of nudges implemented in different ways in different 
contexts (this is principle 2). The second argument is that a decision 
as to what makes a nudge ethical or not requires understanding of 
whether people consider that they are better off for being nudged, as 
judged by themselves; we have seen this latter argument before (Sun-
stein, 2014).  
The first argument is a good one but for the fact that Sunstein is 
employing double standards. Recall that the first of his 8 principles is 
that it is pointless to take ethical issue with nudges because they are 
everywhere and the government uses them anyway. One can’t really 
make a sweeping defence, and then criticize a counterargument em-
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ploying the same tactic. The second argument is essentially an empir-
ical one, and this is where Sunstein dedicates an entire chapter (Chap-
ter 6) to discussing which nudges people like. Here he summarizes 
the results of several surveys conducted, including his own, that have 
been run on samples from multiple nationalities. The resounding 
pattern of results is that people show a strong preference for nudges 
that are deemed to be transparent (e.g., educational campaigns that 
inform people of details that help them make better decisions), as 
compared to nudges that are opaque and operate in ways that are not 
obvious to anyone engaged in the choice environment (e.g., re-
ordering the food in a canteen so that the healthier options are pre-
sented first). Despite this pattern, Sunstein is rather generous with the 
interpretation of it. In chapter 6 he suggests that there is still a strong 
majority that would like nudges even if they aren’t transparent, on 
provision that they work (2016, 146). There are two main problems 
with this chapter. First, it exposes significant issues with the nudge 
programme, by highlighting that it is in fact atheoretical. There is no 
framework or theory that is being used to explain the pattern of re-
sults discussed in Chapter 6, because there actually is no theory or 
framework (for discussion see Osman, 2014). Second, the surveys 
don’t actually do what is necessary given the point of the book. The 
surveys do not report data on whether people consider themselves as 
better off for being nudged (as compared with typical regulatory 
tools), as judged by themselves. They are asked which out of a series 
of hypothetical situations they do have a preference for, and which 
they think are acceptable/not acceptable; this isn’t necessarily getting 
at essential issues about people’s own judgment on the value of 
nudges to them, and their trust in the choice architect’s motives for 
introducing a particular nudge.  
What the book doesn’t do, that it should have done, is use the cri-
teria it introduces on which to evaluate nudges on ethical grounds, 
and then systematically, chapter by chapter, take an example of a 
well-known nudge and go through and evaluate it, and demonstrate 
on those grounds how ethical, or not it is. Chapter 7 comes closest to 
this by focusing on nudges used to promote behaviours that are pro-
tective of our environment (e.g., recycling, reducing energy consump-
tion, water consumption) and evaluating them on several criteria. 
What we can take away from Chapter 7 is that using defaults in the 
context of environmental protection is an effective means of positive-
ly changing behaviour where other regulatory tools have failed. Also, 
Sunstein suggests that active choice can be important, and in cases 
where it is not present, then one has to weigh the costs and benefits of 
making a particular option the automatic default. By which he means 
weighing the benefits of an automatic default against the cost of not 
delivering the experience of active choice, in instances where people 
do want to choose, but in fact (would) choose poorly. But, this all 
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seems to sidestep the point of the discussion, which is to answer the 
question: how ethical are nudges?  
What is Sunstein’s (2016) answer to this question? Ultimately it 
seems that Sunstein is of the view that nudges are indeed ethical, that 
they are useful, that governments are justified in employing them, 
and that when asked, the general public tend to like them, even the 
ones that they aren’t aware of that are influencing their behaviour. 
Importantly, relative to mandates, people are still free to choose to 
ignore nudges. Of course people are free to ignore mandates as well, 
but the penalties are higher for doing this. So, what we can conclude 
here is that the ethical justification for the nudge programme boils 
down to the relative ease of choosing to ignore an option that is 
strongly signalled by a choice architect. But is that really the best so-
lution that a programme of behavioural change has to offer?  
5. Drawing Some Conclusions 
Sunstein’s work has helped to popularize behavioural science, by 
which he essentially means psychology, and his latest book also pays 
testament to this. More to the point, he uses work from psychology to 
showcase to a much larger audience some of the complexities of the 
rights of individuals to make choices and the role that the state plays 
(or should play) in order to encourage individuals to make choices 
that benefit society in the long run. Additionally, while it is the case 
that Sunstein (2015, 2016) acknowledges that active choice may be 
important, which implies that agency is of value, he doesn’t say 
enough about why this might be the case, what the functional value 
of active choice is, and for that matter how that is realized at a fun-
damental psychological level.  
Sunstein neglects the fact that there are key insights from psychol-
ogy that demonstrate that the profound positive effects on mental 
and physical health, as well as decision-making behaviours, involve 
the promotion and strengthening of agency and autonomy over 
choice. This leads to actual not hypothetical changes in behaviour (for 
review see Osman, 2014). Agency and control are fundamental be-
cause they are the mental processes that contribute to reducing uncer-
tainty of the future. Our mental representational structures are built 
on this premise, as well as our internal reward mechanisms, which 
drive actions that seek to assert agency and control. We cannot escape 
the fact that we are goal-driven, and this is precisely the result of a 
crucial belief that our actions can bring about outcomes that we set 
out to achieve; whether it is as mundane as making ourselves another 
cup of tea, or as complex as changing our career. These essential 
properties of our cognitive functioning are the very reason that active 
free choice seems so profoundly important to us on principle, and 
why it is that we feel aggrieved when it is subverted or denied. A 
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successful programme of behavioural change would do well to build 
its theoretical framework on these foundations, and along the way it 
can avoid the ethical tangles that the nudge programme is wrapped 
in.  
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